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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Alan A. Creel appeals from his conviction for possession of marijuana in excess
of three ounces after entering a conditional plea in which he preserved his right to
appeal the district court's decision denying his motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On July 15, 2009, Ada County Deputy Sheriff Kevin Louwsma was on patrol and
conducted a traffic stop of Creel's Chevrolet S-10 truck after he ran the truck's license
plate number on his mobile data terminal ("MDT") and discovered that, although the
truck was black, the vehicle registration indicated the truck was red. (7/30/10 Tr., p.15,
L.15 - p.17, L.6.) The deputy spoke to the driver, Creel, who explained that he had
recently "Rhino-lined his truck [black], that it used to be red, and that he just had not
changed it with the Department of Motor Vehicles." (7/30/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.7-17.) While
talking to Creel, the deputy noticed "signs and symptoms of marijuana usage and also
could smell the strong odor of what [his] training and experience has taught [him] to be
marijuana." (7/30/10 Tr., p.18, L.22 - p.19, L.1.) A subsequent search of Creel's truck
by officers resulted in the seizure of over three ounces of marijuana, and Creel's arrest
for possession of marijuana. (7/30/10 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-25.)
Creel was charged with possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, a
felony. (R., pp.23-24.) Creel filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his
truck, asserting Deputy Louwsma did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic
stop of his truck based merely on the discrepancy between the color of the truck and the
vehicle registration's listed color.

(R., pp.30-35.)

1

The district court initially denied

Creel's suppression motion based on Creel's failure to establish a nexus between the
traffic stop and the discovery of marijuana in his truck. 1 (R., pp.68-71.) After that ruling
was made, "[t]he parties requested a further evidentiary hearing in the matter, which
was held on July 30, 2010." (R., p.78.) After that hearing, during which both Creel and
Deputy Louwsma testified, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order
ruling that Deputy Louwsma conducted a valid traffic stop of Creel's truck because he
had reasonable suspicion the truck may have been stolen and that it displayed fictitious
license plates. (R., pp.78-82.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Creel entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony
possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, preserving his right to appeal the
district court's order denying his suppression motion. (R., pp.93-101; 2/11/11 Tr., p.29,
L.4 - p.44, L.2.) The district court sentenced Creel to a unified term of five years with
one year fixed, and suspended that sentence and placed Creel on probation for five
years. (R., pp.104-109.) Creel filed a timely appeal. (R., pp.113-116.)

1

The district court subsequently explained that its initial ruling was based on a record
in which the parties "relied solely on a few stipulated facts and did not present
witnesses." (R., p.78.)
2

ISSUE
Creel states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Creel's motion to
suppress?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Creel failed to show the district court erred in holding that Deputy Louwsma had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of Creel's vehicle based upon the
discrepancy between the truck color and the color listed on the vehicle registration?

3

ARGUMENT
Creel Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Holding That Deputy Louwsma
Had Reasonable Suspicion To Conduct A Traffic Stop Of Creel's Vehicle Based Upon
The Discrepancy Between The Truck Color And The Color Listed On The Vehicle
Registration
A.

Introduction
Creel contends the district court erred by ruling that Deputy Louwsma had

reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of his truck solely because the color of the
truck (black) did not match the color listed on the truck's vehicle registration (red).
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-7.)

Contrary to Creel's claim, the district court correctly

determined that the disparity between the color listed in his vehicle registration and the
color of his truck provided Deputy Louwsma with reasonable suspicion to believe Creel
might have changed the license plate of his truck with another, or that the truck may
have been stolen.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the

appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review.

State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho

206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d
133, 135 (2005)). The appellate court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the trial court's application of
constitutional principles and determinations of reasonable suspicion, in light of the facts
found. Purdum, 147 Idaho at 207, 207 P.3d at 183 (citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,
302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007)); State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121,127,233 P.3d 52, 58
(2010).

4

C.

Deputy Louwsma Had Reasonable Suspicion To Conduct A Traffic Stop Of
Creel's Truck
It is well-settled that a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth

Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway. State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho
894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991).

Such an investigative detention must be

temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of a stop.
State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 423, 901 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1995). Because a routine
vehicle traffic stop is normally limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an
investigative detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139
Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).
The "reasonable suspicion" standard requires an officer to articulate specific facts
which, along with the reasonable inferences from those facts, justify the suspicion that
the person is or has been involved in criminal activity. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896-897,
821 P.2d at 951-952; State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 430, 925 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Ct.
App. 1996). Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause.
Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951. Whether the officer had the requisite
reasonable suspicion to detain a citizen is determined on the basis of the totality of the
circumstances. State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App.
2004). Although a series of facts may appear innocent when viewed separately, they
may warrant further investigation when viewed together. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho
913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001). The presence of reasonable suspicion is
an objective test that does not depend on the individual officer's subjective thought
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processes. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (Ct App. 2009)
(citing Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435,436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998)); see also Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813 (1996).
On appeal, Creel argues:
... that simply a [sic] having a different color on a vehicle other than the
color listed on the registration, without any more indication of how a crime
may have been committed or how criminal activity may be afoot, is not
enough information to give a law enforcement officer reasonable,
articulable suspicion to stop that vehicle. . ..
. . . [H]ere, it is quite unlikely that a person would switch license plates
from the same model to another. The plates had not been reported
stolen,121 and there was nothing about Mr. Creel's driving that indicated
that he was violating the law.
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Creel has not provided any authority supporting his assertion
that the discrepancy between the color of his truck and the color listed in his vehicle
registration does not provide Deputy Louwsma with reasonable suspicion justifying his
stop of Creel's truck. (See id., pp.6-7.) Despite Creel's speculative contention that "it is
quite unlikely that a person would switch license plates from the same model to another"
(id.), whether criminal activity is "quite unlikely" is not the standard to be applied.
Rather, an investigatory stop is permissible under Terry if a law enforcement officer
"entertains a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway." Gallegos, 120
Idaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951. Deputy Louwsma had reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity for two reasons, and articulated them well. He testified during the suppression
hearing that he had over four and one-half years experience as a deputy sheriff, and

2

Although the state does not contend that the license plates had been reported stolen,
it is unable to discern any testimony establishing they were not reported stolen.
6

explained his suspicions after he realized the color of Creel's truck was different than
the color listed on the truck's vehicle's registration:
The thing that jumps into my mind is usually one of two things. One
is fictitious display of license plates, do those license plates belong to that
car. The other thing is, is it possibly a stolen vehicle with just a license
plate from a Chevrolet S-10, but it could not - maybe not be to that
vehicle.

What I was trying to get was his registration so that I could check
the VIN, make sure that the VIN matched the VIN on the registration and
that the vehicle wasn't stolen, they were the correct license plates to
vehicle is why I was chatting with himPl
{7/30/10 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-5; p.17, Ls.10-16; p.19, Ls.6-11.) The district court summarized
Deputy Louwsma's testimony in its memorandum decision, stating, "due to the color
discrepancy [Deputy Louwsma] thought the vehicle could have fictitious license plates in
violation of I.C. § 49-456(3) or that the vehicle could have been stolen and plates from
another Chevrolet S-10 pickup could have been put on." (R., p.80.) Deputy Louwsma's
testimony "articulate[d] specific facts which, along with the reasonable inferences from
those facts, justify the suspicion" that Creel's vehicle may have either been stolen or
displaying fictitious license plates - both being criminal activities. Gallegos, 120 Idaho
at 896-897, 821 P.2d at 951-952; Martinez, 129 Idaho at 430, 925 P.2d at 1129.
Although, there was a possible innocent explanation for the discrepancy between the
color of Creel's truck and the color listed on the vehicle registration, the deputy was
entitled to conduct a traffic stop of Creel's truck to attempt to clarify his suspicions.

3

Deputy Louwsma testified that the only way to get the VIN number from a vehicle is to
stop that vehicle. (7 /30/10 Tr., p.19, Ls.12-15.)
7

In Aders v. Florida, 67 So.3d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011 ), the Florida Fourth District
Court of Appeals considered the precise issue presented in Creel's case, and reached
the same conclusion as the district court. The Florida appellate court explained:
In arguing that the traffic stop was invalid, Aders contends there
could be no reasonable suspicion he violated state law if Deputy
Pickering's sole reason was that the car's color did not match the color
listed in state records, especially, he asserts, where there is no legal
requirement that a driver notify the state of color changes. While the
statutory and regulatory framework bears out the truth of Aders' assertion,
we nonetheless agree with those courts from other states holding that a
color discrepancy between a car and its computer registration creates
sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop for further
investigation .
. . . The state has not and could not cite to a regulation or statute
that Aders violated by failing to notify the department that he had painted
his blue car black.
But, Deputy Pickering suspected Aders of improperly transferring a
license plate, which is a second-degree misdemeanor under section
320.261, Florida Statutes (2010). A color discrepancy is enough to create
a reasonable suspicion in the mind of a law enforcement officer of the
violation of this criminal law. For example, in Smith v. State, a trooper
"initiated [a] traffic stop because a computer check on the vehicle's license
plate revealed that the plate was registered to a yellow Oldsmobile rather
than a blue and white one." 713 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
After the stop, the trooper discovered that the car belonged to the
passenger, "who had painted it a different color, which explained the
apparently mismatched license plate." Id. The Indiana court held that the
investigator.ii' stop of the vehicle "was valid and supported by reasonable
suspicion."[ 1 Id. at 342. Similarly, in Andrews v. State, the court found
reasonable suspicion to exist where an officer observed a greenish-gold
4

The Smith decision explained:
Here, the evidence was uncontroverted that the license plate on Smith's
blue and white car was registered to a yellow car. Upon conducting a
computer check, Sergeant Henson had reasonable suspicion to believe
that Smith's vehicle had a mismatched plate, and as such, could be stolen
or retagged. Sergeant Henson's traffic stop was valid and comported with
the mandates of the Fourth Amendment.

713 N.E.2d at 342.
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car that a computer check revealed to be registered as silver in color; the
court concluded that it was reasonable for the officer "to infer that the
license plate may have been switched from another car." 151 289 Ga. App.
679, 658 S.E.2d 126, 127-28 (2008). Applying Smith and Andrews to this
case, we affirm the circuit court's denial of the motion to suppress.
Aders, 67 So.3d at 371-372 (original footnotes omitted).
As the Aders, Smith, and Andrews decisions demonstrate, several courts have
concluded that it is reasonable for an officer to suspect criminal activity when confronted
solely with a discrepancy between the color of a vehicle and the color listed on that
vehicle's registration. In Creel's case, the district court likewise reasonably concluded
the state had "established an objectively 'reasonable and articulable suspicion' by
Deputy Louwsma that either the pickup or its occupants were or were about to be
'engaged in criminal activity' thereby justifying the stop of Defendant's pickup."
p.81.)

(R.,

Inasmuch as the testimony of Deputy Louwsma established that he had a

reasonable suspicion under Terry to conduct a traffic stop of Creel's truck, the district
court's decision denying Creel's motion to suppress was correct, and must be affirmed.

5

In Andrews, the Georgia Court of Appeals further stated:
According to the appellants, Jones' belief that the car was a different color
than that listed on the registration was a mere "hunch" that did not give
rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct. As a
threshold matter, we note that it is unlawful to transfer a license plate
assigned to one vehicle to another vehicle and/or to knowingly operate a
vehicle with such improperly transferred tag. Thus, if Jones had reason to
believe that the tag had been improperly transferred, he would have had a
legitimate basis for stopping the car.

658 S.E.2d at 127 (footnote omitted).)
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying Creel's motion to suppress evidence recovered from Creel's vehicle and affirm
Creel's conviction and sentence.
DATED this 16th day of April, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of April, 2012, served a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed
to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

. McKinney
Attorney General
JCM/pm
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